

28 October 1959

NSC BRIEFING

KHRUSHCHEV

- I. Since Khrushchev left China, where he went right after his US trip, he has been on the go almost continuously, and a good part of the time has been spent capitalizing on his US visit.
  - A. From 4 through 10 October, for instance, he made an unprecedented junket across Siberia en route home from Peiping.
    1. This trip was combination of political barnstorming and a victory parade for his US trip.
- II. Khrushchev's five major speeches in Siberia, in effect, set line as to what Soviet people could expect from his American visit.
  - A. Throughout, he showed concern that Soviet people might become so optimistic about reduction of world tensions that they would expect relaxation of domestic pressures and rapid improvement in living conditions.
  - B. His repeated injunctions about need for hard work, remarks that further price reductions would not be forthcoming, and that large-scale private ownership of automobiles only clogged the roads, made it clear that higher living standards will not be achieved easily.

1. Khrushchev's comments on automobiles:

"We want to set up a different system for the use of cars than the one in capitalist countries, where one reasons according to the principle: It is a lousy car but at least it is my own!....Common taxicab parks will be widely developed in our country....Why should one rack one's brains over where to park the car, and to be bothered with it?" State Department review completed

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- C. Similarly, stress on superiority of "socialism" and references to "forces" in the US working to continue the cold war put Soviet people on notice that regime will permit no ideological compromises.
- III. In last stages of trip, Khrushchev's speeches became a little tougher.
- A. For first time since his American visit, he did not include favorable comments about President Eisenhower.
  - B. His reference to "poison of bourgeois ideas" suggests there will be no significant breakthrough of Soviet barriers to exchange of press and radio information.
- IV. On other hand, Khrushchev's generally moderate tone, omission of references to Berlin and other hot spots, and admission that US visit produced warmer international climate were intended to convey impression to Soviet people that new phase in US-Soviet relations has begun.
- V. On 13 October, Khrushchev conferred with Austria's President Schaerf and Foreign Minister Kreisky, and Kreisky has since reported the following to the US embassy in Vienna:
- A. Khrushchev stated that any solution of the "West Berlin issue" could be worked out except absorption of Berlin by West Germany.
  - B. Khrushchev commented that instead of his "generous" free-city offer on Berlin, the USSR could have simply declared an end to Western occupation of West Berlin--and he indicated confidence that the Western powers would not have gone to war.

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1. In this connection, he cited the effect of Soviet warnings to Britain and France at the time of their Suez adventure in 1956.
- C. Khrushchev gave Kreisky the impression that the USSR will accept disarmament controls.
1. But Kreisky expressed doubts that Soviet views on timing and scope of controls would be acceptable to the US.
- D. Khrushchev said the ICBM has made manned aircraft and other conventional weapons obsolete.
- E. Khrushchev indicated that he had examined the cost of shifting the Soviet military system to missiles, and that in the end this would be cheaper than maintaining a system based on conventional armaments.

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